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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
42 U.S.C. 1396(p) 
(b)(1) "...the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the 
following individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual described in (a)(1)(B), the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or upon sale of the 
property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the individual.... 
(c)(1)(A) ".. .if an institutionalized individual.. .disposes of assets for less than fair 
market value on or after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the 
individual is ineligible for medical assistance for services...." 
(c)(2) "An individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance by reason of 
paragraph (1) to the extent that— 
(A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was transferred 
to~ 
(ii) a child of such individual who...is blind or permanently and 
totally disabled... 
(iv) a son or daughter of such individual...who was residing in such 
individual's home for a period of at least two years immediately 
before the date the individual becomes and institutionalized 
individual, and who...provided care to such individual which 
permitted such individual to reside at home rather than in such an 
institution or facility...." 
(See Addendum for complete text of 1396(p)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee makes the following additions to and clarifications of the Statement of 
the Case, and Statement of the facts presented by Appellant. 
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Following the death of Rulon J. Hone, Alta Hone became the primary beneficiary 
under the Trust. (R. 149-155, Finding of Fact 4,5). Alta Hone became ill and required 
institutional care. (T. 82, R. 149-155, Finding of Fact 7). Alton Hone, one of the 
Trustees of the Trust and the Appellant in this matter, as well as Lloyd Hone, Appellee, 
recognized that Medicaid could provide financial assistance for the institutional care. (R. 
149-155, Finding of Fact 8). The parties recognized that any assistance provided would 
subject her estate to a Medicaid lien or to a statutory right of reimbursement. (R. 149-
155, Finding of Fact 8). 
Lloyd Hone met with Medicaid representatives and advised other family members 
that he qualified for a Medicaid exemption that would allow him to remain in the subject 
residential property without it being subject to the Medicaid lien. (R. 149-155, Finding of 
Fact 9, T. 29). The exemption was based upon the number of years that Lloyd had lived 
in the home and provided care to Alta and additionally based upon his status as a disabled 
person. (T. 29, 51, 83, 90, Addendum). 
Alton recognized prior to conveying the property that under Medicaid regulations, 
only certain people could obtain the residential property as a permitted transferee. 
(T.30/27 -31/2). Alton recognized that Lloyd was a permitted transferee under Medicaid 
(T. 30/27-31/2, 58, 59, 63, 64). Alton recognized that none of the other family members 
nor Alta's trust were permitted transferees under Medicaid and that Lloyd was the only 
family member who was a permitted transferee. (T. 58, 59, 61, 63, 64). The decision was 
made by Alton, as trustee, to transfer the property to Lloyd so that the property would not 
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be taken or liened under the Medicaid provisions. (T. 55, 62). Although Alton knew that 
neither he, the trust, nor other family members were permitted transferees, he asserts that 
he entered into an agreement, prior to conveying the property, whereby Lloyd would 
receive the property in order to avoid the Medicaid lien but hold the property in trust for 
Alton and other non-permitted transferee family members. (T. 60, 64, 65 ). It was the 
intent of Alton that the deed would transfer the property from the Trust and be held by 
Lloyd until the death of Alta, and then that the home would be returned to the Trust for 
the benefit of Alton and other family members. (R. 149-155, Finding of Fact 11). The 
court below found that the deed was made, prepared and executed for the purpose of 
avoiding the Medicaid lien. (R. 149-155, Finding of Fact 12). The Court found the 
above arrangement to be a constructive trust, which was not a permitted transferee under 
the Medicaid rules (R. 149-155, Finding of Fact 13, 17). 
In its Conclusions of Law, the Court concluded that Alton was charged to know 
the law and that he could not characterize the conveyance of the property one way when 
attempting to obtain Medicaid benefits for Alta (i.e. a transfer to Lloyd Hone, a permitted 
transferee, which would remove the property from Alta's estate) but then characterize it a 
different way in attempting to enforce a constructive trust (i.e. a conveyance to Lloyd 
Hone, acting as a trustee for the beneficiaries, in order to bring the property into Alta's 
estate). (R. 149-155, Conclusion of Law 1, 3). 
Following a Motion for a New Trial, which was denied, the Court modified the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by its ruling dated March 7, 2002, and 
3 
concluded that after weighing the evidence and the conduct of the parties, Alton had 
unclean hands given, among other things, that Alton intended to use the transfer of 
property as a means of avoiding a Medicaid lien and Medicaid's statutory right of 
reimbursement. (R. 199, 200). The Court concluded that Alton was not entitled to 
equitable relief. (R. 199, 220). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Medicaid rules impose a lien on a recipient's property for reimbursement for 
assistance provided to the property owner. This makes sense in that it prevents a property 
owner from transferring their property to family members and thereby voluntarily 
impoverishing himself in order to receive welfare at taxpayers' expense. Exemptions 
exist such that a residential property may be conveyed to persons living with and 
providing care for the Medicaid recipient and additionally for a disabled adult child living 
with the potential recipient. Lloyd Hone was a permitted transferee under both of these 
Medicaid exemptions because he had lived with and provided care for Alta for a period 
greater than two years, allowing her to remain at home rather than being institutionalized, 
and further because he was an adult child living in the residence. Plaintiff sought to 
avoid the Medicaid lien and the statutory right of reimbursement by deeding the 
residential property from the express trust to the permitted transferee, Lloyd Hone, after 
allegedly entering into an agreement that would place the property in a constructive trust 
for the original beneficiaries upon the same terms and conditions of the express trust. 
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This scheme per se violates the Medicaid provisions and constitutes unclean hands on 
Alton's part without any further showing of knowledge or wilfulness. 
Equity follows the law and a claimant is not entitled to equitable relief when the 
equitable relief would, as here, violate legislative enactments. Courts should not be 
called upon to aid a man whose cause is founded upon his own illegal act. As found by 
the trial court, deeding the home to a trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries would be in 
violation of the Medicaid regulations. Plaintiff, by this action, requests the Court to do 
that which the Plaintiff may not legally do. The trial court properly refused to do so. 
Alton, as trustee, affirmatively (and wilfully) acted to transfer the residential 
property, for the purpose of obtaining medical assistance on behalf of Alta Hone, in a 
manner calculated to avoid the medicaid lien and the obligation of reimbursement, while 
at the same time creating an "understood" constructive trust which retained the very 
interests he purported to convey away. Such an act constitutes not only a private wrong 
to be weighed in the balancing of the equities, but more importantly constitutes a 
significant public wrong. Alton, by asking the court to ratify and finalize his scheme, 
seeks to avoid the consequences of the medicaid regulation by creating an interest in the 
residential property for himself and other family members, despite the medicaid 
prohibitions against such a transfer. The trial court properly exercised its discretion and 
weighed the equities in denying the equitable relief requested by the plaintiff. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT ALTON HAD UNCLEAN 
HANDS AND THAT THE REQUESTED EQUITABLE RELIEF WAS, 
THEREFORE UNAVAILABLE. 
The Medicaid provisions set forth in the Addendum establish as a matter of 
law that a person wishing to obtain medical assistance under Medicaid may not dispose 
of assets for less than fair market value unless the transferee qualifies as a permitted 
transferee under 42 U.S.C. section 1396p(c)(2). If the assets are transferred to an 
ineligible person or entity, the medical assistance may not be obtained and a lien will 
attach to the asset. (Addendum). Lloyd Hone, as a totally disabled child of a person 
seeking medical assistance, and as a child of such individual residing in the residence for 
a period of at least two years, who provided care to such individual which permitted such 
individual to remain at home rather than being institutionalized, was a permitted 
transferee of the residential property. ( Addendum, T. 30, 31, 58, 59, 63, 64). Appellants 
now seek a remedy which ignores the medicaid regulations and request that this Court 
vest the residential property in Appellants. 
The trial court held that the Appellants had come before the court with unclean 
hands and were therefore not entitled to the remedy sought. ( R. 149-155, Conclusion of 
Law 3, 6, T. 199-201, 220). This ruling is appropriate under Utah law. As stated in 
Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P. 2d 467 (Utah 1992)» "equity follows the law. It cannot abridge 
an explicit, statutory requirement55 (cites omitted). Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666 
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(UtahApp. 1992) unequivocally holds that "although a court, sitting in equity, exercises 
discretion in granting or denying relief,...it does not have the authority to ignore existing 
principles of law in favor of its view of the equities" (cites omitted). See also Davis v. 
Dept. Of Health and Welfare, 943 P. 2d 59 (Idaho App. 1997) and cases cited therein, 
holding that "It is well understood that equitable principles cannot supercede the positive 
enactment of the legislature." 
Under the doctrine of unclean hands, "he who comes into equity must come with 
clean hands....The maxim means that equity refuses to lend its aid in any manner to one 
seeking its active interposition who has been guilty of unlawful or inequitable conduct in 
the matter with relation to which he seeks relief." 30A C.J.S., Equity, section 102 at page 
304, 305. The maxim was further described by the United States Supreme Court as 
follows: 
"It is one of the fundamental principles upon which equity jurisprudence is 
founded, that before a complainant can have a standing in court he must first show 
that not only has he a good and meritorious cause of action, but he must come into 
the court with clean hands. He must be frank and fair with the court, nothing 
about the case under consideration should be guarded, but everything that tends to 
a full and fair determination of the matters in controversy should be placed before 
the court." The governing principle is "that whenever a party who, as actor, seeks 
to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated 
conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then 
the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court will refuse to 
interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy." 
Keystone Driller Co, v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-245 (1933). (Cites 
omitted). 
Utah courts have similarly refused to assist persons who come before the court 
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with unclean hands. Under Battistone v. American Light and Development Co., 607 P. 2d 
837 (Utah 1980), "a court of equity will generally not assist one in extricating himself in 
circumstances which he has created." See also Pacific Metal Co. v. Tracy Collins Bank 
& Trust Co., 21 Utah 2d 400, 446 P.2d 303 (Utah 1986), "It is a general principle that 
one who commits a wrong must take the consequence and then cannot complain that 
someone else doesn't rescue him therefrom" and Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382 (Utah 
1985), "It is generally accepted that equity refuses to lend its aid to a party whose 
conduct is inequitable." 
Under the Restatement of Contracts, Section 598, " a party to an illegal bargain 
can neither recover damages for breach therefore nor, by rescinding the bargain, recover 
the performance that he has rendered thereunder or its value, except as stated in Section 
599-609." Section 598 was adopted by Utah courts mMcCormick v. Life Insurance 
Corp. Of America, 308 P. 2d 949 (Utah 1957). Comment "a" of section 598 of the 
Restatement of Contracts states, 
When relief is denied, it is because the Plaintiff is a wrongdoer and to such a 
person the law denies relief. Courts do not wish to aid a man who founded his 
cause of action upon his own immoral or illegal act. If from the plaintiffs own 
statement or otherwise it appears that the bargain forming the basis of the action is 
opposed to public policy or transgresses statutory prohibitions, the courts 
ordinarily give him no assistance. The court's refusal is not for the sake of the 
defendant, but because it will not aid such a plaintiff. 
Alton's argument that the trial court erred in finding unclean hands because there is no 
finding that the transaction was illegal or improper ignores the testimony of Alton Hone 
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and the plain reading of the Medicaid requirements. Medicaid requirements as contained 
in 42 U.S.C. section 1396(p) include the following: 
(b)(1) "...the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the 
following individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual described in (a)(1)(B), the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or upon sale of the 
property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the individual.... 
(c)(1)(A) "...if an institutionalized individual...disposes of assets for less than fair 
market value on or after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the 
individual is ineligible for medical assistance for services...." 
(c)(2) "An individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance by reason of 
paragraph (1) to the extent that— 
(A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was transferred 
to--
(ii) a child of such individual who...is blind or permanently and 
totally disabled... 
(iv) a son or daughter of such individual...who was residing in such 
individual's home for a period of at least two years immediately 
before the date the individual becomes an institutionalized 
individual, and who...provided care to such individual which 
permitted such individual to reside at home rather than in such an 
institution or facility...." 
(Addendum). 
Thus, to be exempt, the residential property must be transferred to a permitted transferee. 
The evidence is clear that Lloyd Hone was a permitted transferee and the only family 
member that was a permitted transferee. (T. 30, 31, 58, 58, 63, 64). Alton knew that 
Lloyd was the only permitted transferee. (T. 58, 59, 61, 63, 64). 
Appellant argues that there was no intent to "trick" the government. However, 
9 
there is a "trick" if the permitted transaction was simply a sham to obtain medical 
assistance from Medicaid and avoid the Medicaid lien and the statutory right of 
reimbursement, while the real scheme was the creation of a constructive trust which 
would result in the ownership of the residential property by unqualified transferees. This 
is what the evidence clearly establishes Alton wanted to do. He wanted to avoid the 
medicaid lien and the obligation of reimbursement by conveying the home to Lloyd 
without strings attached, as allowed under the Medicaid regulations. ( T. 55, 62). 
Because Lloyd refused to implement the illegal portion of the scheme, Alton now 
requests the court to do so by creating the constructive trust and ruling that the residential 
property belongs to plaintiff. This would be an improper transfer under the Medicaid 
guidelines and a violation of the statutory framework regulating persons that may 
properly be recipients of the residential property. (Addendum A). The trial court 
properly held such a trust to be an impermissible transferee and found the imposition of 
the constructive trust to be illegal. (R. 149-155, Conclusion of Law 3, 6). 
Alton's unclean hands lie primarily in the fact that while he knew neither he nor 
the other beneficiaries of the express trust (other than Lloyd) were permitted transferees 
under Medicaid, he sought a transfer of the property to an undisclosed constructive trust 
with the intent to avoid the lien, but in reality kept the residential property for the original 
unqualified beneficiaries contrary to the Medicaid medical assistance and avoid the lien, 
contrary to the Medicaid statute. The trial court properly found this to be the case. (R. 
149-155, Finding of Fact 11, 13, 17 and Conclusion of Law 1, 3). 
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II. ALTON HONE COMES BEFORE THE COURT WITH UNCLEAN 
HANDS UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SATISFY ANY 
REQUIREMENT OF KNOWLEDGE OR WILFULNESS REQUIRED 
UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Appellant seeks to impose an element of wilfulness and knowledge that is not 
justified under Utah law. Utah law relating to unclean hands and other related rules of 
equity imposes no such requirement. As set forth in Point I above, Alton acted with 
unclean hands. Alton further acted with sufficient knowledge and wilfulness to satisfy 
the doctrine of unclean hands in that he knew, or was deemed to have known, that Lloyd 
was the only heir that was a permitted transferee under the medicaid statute and that no 
other beneficiary was a permitted transferee. (T. 58, 59, 61, 63, 64). He knew that the 
agreement with Lloyd, wherein Lloyd would hold the property in a constructive trust for 
the beneficiaries, was for the purpose of avoiding the Medicaid lien and Medicaid's right 
of reimbursement. (T. 55, 60, 62, 64, 65). He intended that the transfer would result in 
the beneficiaries taking possession of the property even though they were not permitted 
transferees, which he was deemed to have known. (T. 60, 64, 65). Although Alton 
argues that he did not know that such an agreement was a violation of law, he is charged 
with that knowledge. (R. 149-155, Conclusion of Law 1, 3). 
There is no further knowledge or wilfulness requirement imposed by Utah law. 
First, even the authority cited by Appellants demonstrates that the doctrine of unclean 
hands may be used in contexts other than fraud. The doctrine of clean hands is not 
limited to fraud but "usually involves fraud, illegality, unfairness, or bad faith." See 
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William J. Lawrence, III, Note, The Application of the Clean Hands Doctrine in Damage 
Actions, 57 Notre Dame Law, 673 Notre Dame Lawyer (1982). (emphasis added). See 
also Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive M. Mack Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945) 
"Accordingly one's misconduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature as to be 
punishable as a crime or as to justify legal proceedings of any character. Any willful act 
concerning the cause of action which rightfully can be said to transgress equitable 
standards of conduct is sufficient cause for the invocation of the maxim ..." (Emphasis 
added). Therefore, it is not necessary that Alton acted with knowledge that his actions 
were contrary to law. Alton wilfully acted to retain an interest in the home after transfer 
of the asset to a permitted transferee for the purpose of avoiding the medicaid lien and 
obtaining medical services on behalf of Alta Hone without the obligation of 
reimbursement, contrary to the Medicaid statutes set forth in the Addendum. 
(Addendum, T. 60, 64, 65). 
It should be noted that Alton is now requesting this court to complete the 
transaction contrary to law. Alton can not now say that he is without knowledge that the 
transfer of the home must be to a permitted transferee. Even if he originally acted in 
ignorance of the law, he is now requesting this court to complete the transaction despite 
his present actual knowledge of the medicaid provisions prohibiting transfer to anyone 
other than a permitted transferee. 
Second, the doctrine of unclean hands may be imposed in Utah with or without 
actual knowledge. In Pledger v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572,577 (Utah 1999), the Utah 
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Supreme Court rejected a similar defense based upon the plaintiffs argument that an 
agreement was unknowingly violated. The Court held, 
"We refuse to entertain Dr. Pledger's arguments concerning equitable doctrines 
such as laches when it was he who instigated and advanced the litigation in 
violation of his Agreement with Cigna-whether knowingly or not—by seeking 
payment for his services directly from [defendant] and demanding sums in excess 
of the reduced fee. See LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988) 
(stating that 'a party seeking equity must do so with clean hands')." 
(Emphasis added). 
As a matter of law, Alton is charged with the knowledge that his actions were a 
violation of the Medicaid provisions found in Title 42. He wilfully acted to transfer the 
assets contrary to medicaid provisions , even if he was unaware at the time that such acts 
were prohibited. The court below properly concluded that Alton came before the Court 
with unclean hands. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION. 
BALANCED THE EQUITIES AND CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
ALTON'S REQUESTED RELIEF WAS NOT AVAILABLE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, 
The trial court "weighed all of the evidence and examined the conduct of both 
parties" and concluded that Alton is "not entitled to equitable relief." (R. 199, Para 1). 
Based upon the equities in this matter, such a conclusion was well within the discretion 
of the court. As set forth in Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive M. Mack Co., 324 
U.S. 806, 815 (1945), "This maxim necessarily gives wide range to the equity court's use 
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of discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant. It is 'not bound by formula or 
restrained by any limitation that tends to trammel the free and just exercise of 
discretion.'" (cite omitted). 
In his balancing of the equities, Alton, as trustee, fails to include a key component 
of the equation. Alton's actions not only violate a private interest but a public one as well. 
The trial court found that Alton, as trustee, should have known that the transfer of the 
residential property into a constructive trust was illegal. (R. 149-155, Conclusion of Law 
1, 3). This improper conduct impacts a public interest which weighs heavily in any 
balancing of the equities. "Moreover, where a suit in equity concerns the public interest 
as well as the private interests of the litigants this doctrine assumed even wider and more 
significant proportions. For if an equity court properly uses the maxim to withhold its 
assistance in such a case it not only prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his 
transgression but averts an injury to the public." See Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. 
Automotive M. Mack Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945). 
In the present matter, Alton, as trustee, seeks to avoid a medicaid lien or 
reimbursement to medicaid for the medical services provided to Alta Hone. (T. 25, 26, 
59, 63). To allow surreptitious transfers to a constructive trust creates a procedure for the 
avoidance of lawful medicaid liens and rights of reimbursement for future recipients of 
medical assistance from medicaid, thereby impacting available public funds. Medicaid 
simply does not contemplate such an exception or procedure and the reimbursement 
rights of medicaid would be eviscerated by such a court created mechanism for avoiding a 
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medicaid lien or right of reimbursement. The equities involved in the public interest far 
outweigh any interest of the undisclosed beneficiaries of the constructive trust. 
It should be noted that one of the cases cited by Appellants, at page 14 of his brief, 
JankevJanke, 366, KY.S.2d910, 47AD.2d445} 450-451 (N.YAD. 1975), cited for the 
proposition that the equities must be weighed, specifically states that "it is a recognized 
principle that where a party must trace her cause of action to an illegal transaction there 
can be no recovery," and concludes that where there has been a statutory violation, a 
party "cannot invoke the power of the equity court to impose a constructive trust...." 
(Emphasis added, cites omitted). This is consistent with the finding in the present matter 
and demonstrates that even if the equities must be balanced it is not inappropriate for a 
court to give great weight to the fact that the proposed transaction would be illegal. 
Under such circumstances, it is entirely appropriate to conclude that no relief should be 
granted. 
The court below properly used its discretion in balancing the equities and 
concluded that Alton was not entitled to the requested equitable relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Alton Hone comes before the court with unclean hands. Alton seeks to avoid the 
effects of clear Medicaid regulations by seeking a constructive trust. He is seeking relief 
from this Court which contravenes such statutes and which would result in the Court 
doing the veiy thing which is unlawful for Alton to do himself. Alton was charged with 
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knowledge of the Medicaid regulations and therefore comes before the court with unclean 
hands. He now has actual knowledge of such regulations but persists in seeking the 
disallowed relief. Because there is no other requirement of knowledge or wilfulness, 
Alton's actions in seeking to obtain an improper transfer of the home contrary to 
Medicaid requirements constitutes unclean hands. Because there is both a private and a 
significant public interest involved in the present matter, the court below appropriately 
balanced the equities and properly exercised its discretion in denying Alton his requested 
relief. 
Dated this J^ day of March, 2004. 
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RESEARCH GUIDE 
Federal Procedure: 
17 Fed Proc L Ed, Health, Education, and Welfare § 42:422. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
1. Validity of regulations est favors enforcement of public policy as expressed 
2. Injunctive relief in Medicaid statutes and regulations, because plain-
tiffs make viable claim that proposed increase runs 
1. Validity of regulations afoul of 42 USCS § 1396o requirement that any cost 
Medicaid recipients' challenge to federal regula- sharing be ''norninal.'' Kansas Hosp. Ass'n vWhite-
tion implementing 42 USCS § 1396o(a)(3), which man (1993, DC Kan) 835 F Supp 1548,42 Soc Sec 
requires copayments to be "nominal in amount,'* Rep Serv 708. 
must fail, even though copayment for inpatient hos- Preliminary injunction is denied hospitals and 
pital services in Kansas is $325, where Congress has individuals challenging proposed amendment to state 
adopted, parenthetically in statute, definition of Medicaid plan, where state submitted evidence 
"nominal in amount" long codified in 42 CFR showing that proposed increase of co-payment to 
§ 447.54(c), because court is bound by Secretary's $325 was determined after applying 50 percent to 
interpretation, since it has been given force and ef- average, or typical, amount agency pays for each day 
feet of law by legislative reenactment and ratifica- of inpatient hospital care for Medicaid recipients, 
tion. Kansas Hosp. Ass'n v Whiteman (1994, DC because plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on their 
Kan) 851 F Supp 401, 44 Soc Sec Rep Serv 524. claim that proposed co-payment is not ''nominal in 
amount" as required by 42 USCS § 1396o(a)(3), 
2. Injunctive relief (b)(3), since amount is consistent with federal regu-
State is temporarily restrained from implementing lations permitting state to impose fixed co-payment 
amendment to increase co-payment requirement of amount for inpatient hospital care. Kansas Hosp. 
Medicaid beneficiaries from $25 to $325 per admis- Ass'n v Whiteman (1993, DC Kan) 835 F Supp 
sion for inpatient hospital services, where hospitals 1556, 42 Soc Sec Rep Serv 716, 4 ADD 321, affd 
and individuals showed that amendment may cause without op sub nom Williams v Whiteman (1994, 
them irreparable harm, outweighing any potential CA10 Kan) 36 F3d 1106, reported in full (1994, 
damage caused state by delay, and that public inter- CA10 Kan) 1994 US App LEXIS 25798. 
§ 1396p. Liens, adjustments and recoveries, and transfers of assets 
(a) Imposition of lien against the property of an individual on account of 
medical assistance rendered to him under a State plan. (1) No lien may 
be imposed against the property of any individual prior to his death on ac-
count of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under the State 
plan, except— 
(A) pursuant to the judgment of a court on account of benefits incorrectly 
paid on behalf of such individual, or 
(B) in the case of the real property of an individual— 
(i) who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility 
for the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individ-
ual is required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution 
under the State plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a 
minimal amount of his income required for personal needs, and 
(ii) with respect to whom the State determines, after notice and op-
portunity for a hearing (in accordance with procedures established by 
the State), that he cannot reasonably be expected to be discharged from 
the medical institution and to return home, 
except as provided in paragraph (2). 
(2) No lien may be imposed under paragraph (1)(B) on such individual's 
home if— 
QK1 
(A) the spouse of such individual, 
(B) such individual's child who is under age 21, or (with respect to States 
eligible to participate in the State program established under title XVI [42 
USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or 
(with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such 
program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS 
§ 1382c], or 
(C) a sibling of such individual (who has an equity interest in such home 
and who was residing in such individual's home for a period of at least 
one year immediately before the date of the individual's admission to the 
medical institution), 
is lawfully residing in such home. 
(3) Any hen imposed with respect to an individual pursuant to paragraph 
(1)(B) shall dissolve upon that individual's discharge from the medical 
institution and return home. 
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under a 
State plan. (1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance cor-
rectly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, 
except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assis-
tance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the 
case of the following individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection (a)(1)(B), the 
State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or 
upon sale of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of medicai 
assistance paid on behalf of the individual 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when 
the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical 
assistance consisting of— 
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and 
related hospital and prescription drug services, or 
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State pl^n. 
(C)(i) In the case of an individual who has received (or is entitled to 
receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance policy in connection 
with which assets or resources are disregarded in the manner described 
in clause (ii), except as provided in such clause, the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate on account of medi-
cal assistance paid on behalf of the individual for nursing facility and 
other long-term care services. 
(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an individual who received 
medical assistance under a State plan of a State which had a State plan 
amendment approved as of May 14, 1993, which provided for the dis-
regard of any assets or resources— 
(I) to the extent that payments are made under a long-term care in-
surance policy; or 
(II) because an individual has received (or is entitled to receive) 
benefits under a long-term care insurance policy. 
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(2) Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after 
the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time— 
(A) when he has no surviving child who is under age 21, or (with respect 
to States eligible to participate in the State program established under title 
XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or permanently and totally dis-
abled, or (with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in 
such program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS 
§ 1382c]; and 
(B) in the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection 
(a)(1)(B), when— 
(i) no sibling of the individual (who was residing in the individual's 
home for a period of at least one year immediately before the date of 
the individual's admission to the medical institution), and 
(ii) no son or daughter of the individual (who was residing in the 
individual's home for a period of at least two years immediately before 
the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution, and 
who establishes to the satisfaction of the State that he or she provided 
care to such individual which permitted such individual to reside at 
home rather than in an institution), 
is lawfully residing in such home who has lawfully resided in such home 
on a continuous basis since the date of the individual's admission to the 
medical institution. 
(3) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance with stan-
dards specified by the Secretary) under which the agency shall waive the 
application of this subsection (other than paragraph (1)(C)) if such applica-
tion would work an undue hardship as determined on the basis of criteria 
established by the Secretary. 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a 
deceased individual— 
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate 
law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to'whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and 
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), includ-
ing such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased in-
dividual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
(c) Taking into account certain transfers of assets. (1)(A) In order to meet 
the requirements of this subsection for purposes of section 1902(a)(18) 
[42 USCS § 1396a(a)(18)], the State plan must provide that if an 
institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual (or, at the 
option of a State, a noninstitutionalized individual or the spouse of such 
an individual) disposes of assets for less than fair market value on or af-
ter the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the individual is 
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ineligible for medical assistance for services described in subparagraph 
(C)(i) (or, in the case of a noninstitutionalized individual, for the services 
described in subparagraph (C)(ii)) during the period beginning on the date 
specified in subparagraph (D) and equal to the number of months speci-
fied in subparagraph (E). 
(B)(i) The look-back date specified in this subparagraph is a date that is 
36 months (or, in the case of payments from a trust or portions of a 
trust that are treated as assets disposed of by the individual pursuant to 
paragraph (3)(A)(iii) or (3)(B)(ii) of subsection (d), 60 months) before 
the date specified in clause (ii). 
(ii) The date specified in this clause, with respect to— 
(I) an institutionalized individual is the first date as of which the in-
dividual both is an institutionalized individual and has applied for 
medical assistance under the State plan, or 
(II) a noninstitutionalized individual is the date on which the indi-
vidual applies for medical assistance under the State plan or, if later, 
the date on which the individual disposes of assets for less than fair 
market value. 
(C)(i) The services described in this subparagraph with respect to an 
institutionalized individual are the following: 
(I) Nursing facility services. 
(II) A level of care in any institution equivalent to that of nursing 
facility services. 
(III) Home or community-based services furnished under a waivfer 
granted under subsection (c) or (d) of section 1915 [42 USCS 
§ 1396n(c) or (d)J. 
(ii) The services described in this subparagraph with respect to a 
noninstitutionalized individual are services (not including any service$ 
described in clause (i)) that are described in paragraph (7), (22), or (24) 
of section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)(7), (22), or (24)], and, at the 
option of a State, other long-term care services for which medical as-
sistance is otherwise available under the State plan to individuals 
requiring long-term care. 
(D) The date specified in this subparagraph is the first day of the first 
month during or after which assets have been transferred for less than fair 
market value and which does not occur in any other periods of ineligibil-
ity under this subsection. 
(E)(i) With respect to an institutionalized individual, the number of 
months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individual shall 
be equal to— 
(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets transferred 
by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or after the look-back 
date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), divided by 
(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nursing facility 
services in the State (or, at the option of the State, in the community 
in which the individual is institutionalized) at the time of applica-
tion. 
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(ii) With respect to a noninstitutionalized individual, the number of 
months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individual shall 
not be greater than a number equal to— 
(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets transferred 
by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or after the look-back 
date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), divided by 
(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nursing facility 
services in the State (or, at the option of the State, in the community 
in which the individual is institutionalized) at the time of applica-
tion. 
(iii) The number of months of ineligibility otherwise determined under 
clause (i) or (ii) with respect to the disposal of an asset shall be 
reduced— 
(I) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under clause (i), 
by the number of months of ineligibility applicable to the individual 
under clause (ii) as a result of such disposal, and 
(II) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under clause 
(ii), by the number of months of ineligibility applicable to the indi-
vidual under clause (i) as a result of such disposal. 
(2) An individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance by reason of 
paragraph (1) to the extent that— 
(A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was 
transferred to— 
(i) the spouse of such individual; 
(ii) a child of such individual who (I) is under age 21, or (II) (with re-
spect to States eligible to participate in the State program established 
under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or permanently and 
totally disabled, or (with respect to States which are not eligible to 
participate in such program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 
1614 [42 USCS § 1382c]; 
(iii) a sibling of such individual who has an equity interest in such 
home and who was residing in such individual's home for a period of 
at least one year immediately before the date the individual becomes 
an institutionalized individual; or 
(iv) a son or daughter of such individual (other than a child described 
in clause (ii)) who was residing in such individual's home for a period 
of at least two years immediately before the date the individual 
becomes an institutionalized individual, and who (as determined by the 
State) provided care to such individual which permitted such individ-
ual to reside at home rather than in such an institution or facility; 
(B) the assets— 
(i) were transferred to the individual's spouse or to another for the sole 
benefit of the individual's spouse, 
(ii) were transferred from the individual's spouse to another for the sole 
benefit of the individual's spouse, 
(iii) were transferred to, or to a trust (including a trust described in 
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subsection (d)(4)) established solely for the benefit of, the individual's 
child described in subparagraph (A)(ii)(II), or 
(iv) were transferred to a trust (including a trust described in subsec-
tion (d)(4)) established solely for the benefit of an individual under 65 
years of age who is disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42 
USCS § 1382c(a)(3)l; 
(C) a satisfactory showing is made to the State (in accordance with 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary) that (i) the individual intended 
to dispose of the assets either at fair market value, or for other valuable 
consideration, (ii) the assets were transferred exclusively for a purpose 
other than to qualify for medical assistance, or (iii) all assets transferred 
for less than fair market value have been returned to the individual; or 
(D) the State determines, under procedures established by the State (in 
accordance with standards specified by the Secretary), that the denial of 
eligibility would work an undue hardship as determined on the basis of 
criteria established by the Secretary; [.] 
(3) For purposes of this subsection, in the case of an asset held by an indi-
vidual in common with another person or persons in a joint tenancy, tenancy 
in common, or similar arrangement, the asset (or the affected portion of such 
asset) shall be considered to be transferred by such individual when any ac-
tion is taken, either by such individual or by any other person, that reduces 
or eliminates such individual's ownership or control of such asset. 
(4) A State (including a State which has elected treatment under section 
1902(f) [42 USCS § 1396a(f)]) may not provide for any period of ineligibil-
ity for an individual due to transfer of resources for less than fair market 
value except in accordance with this subsection. In the case of a transfer by 
the spouse of an individual which results in a period of ineligibility for medi-
cal assistance under a State plan for such individual, a State shall, using a 
reasonable methodology (as specified by the Secretary), apportion such pe-
riod of ineligibility (or any portion of such period) among the individual atip 
the individual's spouse if the spouse otherwise becomes eligible for medical 
assistance under the State plan. 
(5) In this subsection, the term *'resources" has the meaning given suqjt* 
term in section 1613 [42 USCS § 1382b], without regard to the exclusion 
described in subsection (a)(1) thereof. 
(d) Treatment of trust amounts. (1) For purposes of determining an individu-
al's eligibility for, or amount of, benefits under a State plan under this titlf/ 
[42 USCS §§ 1396 et seqj, subject to paragraph (4), the rules specified ill4 
paragraph (3) shall apply to a trust established by such individual 
(2)(A) For purposes of this subsection, an individual shall be considered tQ^  
have established a trust if assets of the individual were used to form al| 
or part of the corpus of the trust and if any of the following individuals 
established such trust other than by will: 
(i) The individual, 
(ii) The individual's spouse, 
(iii) A person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
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authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or the 
individual's spouse. 
(iv) A person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the 
direction or upon the request of the individual or the individual's 
spouse. 
(B) In the case of a trust the corpus of which includes assets of an indi-
vidual (as determined under subparagraph (A)) and assets of any other 
person or persons, the provisions of this subsection shall apply to the por-
tion of the trust attributable to the assets of the individual. 
(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply without regard 
to— 
(i) the purposes for which a trust is established, 
(ii) whether the trustees have or exercise any discretion under the trust, 
(hi) any restrictions on when or whether distributions may be made 
from the trust, or 
(iv) any restrictions on the use of distributions from the trust. 
(3)(A) In the case of a revocable trust— 
(i) the corpus of the trust shall be considered resources available to the 
individual, 
(ii) payments from the trust to or for the benefit of the individual shall 
be considered income of the individual, and 
(iii) any other payments from the trust shall be considered assets 
disposed of by the individual for purposes of subsection (c). 
(B) In the case of an irrevocable trust— 
(i) if there are any circumstances under which payment from the trust 
could be,made to or for the benefit of the individual, the portion of the 
corpus from which, or the income on the corpus from which, payment 
to the individual could be made shall be considered resources available 
to the individual, and payments from that portion of the corpus or 
income— 
(I) to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be considered income 
of the individual, and 
(II) for any other purpose, shall be considered a transfer of assets by 
the individual subject to subsection (c); and 
(ii) my portion of the trust from which, or any income on the corpus 
from which, no payment could under any circumstances be made to the 
individual shall be considered, as of the date of establishment of the 
trust (or, if later, the date on which payment to the individual was 
foreclosed) to be assets disposed by the individual for purposes of 
subsection (c), and the value of the trust shall be determined for 
purposes of such subsection by including the amount of any payments 
made from such portion of the trust after such date. 
(4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the following trusts: 
(A) A trust containing the assets of an individual under age 65 who is 
disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3) [42 USCS § 1382c(a)(3)]) and 
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which is established for the benefit of such individual by a parent, 
grandparent, legal guardian of the individual, or a court if the State will 
receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of such individ-
ual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf 
of the individual under a State plan under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et 
seq.}. 
(B) A trust established in a State for the benefit of an individual if— 
(i) the trust is composed only of pension, Social Security, and other 
income to the individual (and accumulated income in the trust), 
(ii) the State will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the 
death of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical as-
sistance paid on behalf of the individual under a State plan under this 
title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], and 
(iii) the State makes medical assistance available to individuals de-
scribed in section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V) [42 USCS § 1396a(a)(10)(A)-
(ii)(V)], but does not make such assistance available to individuals for 
nursing facility services under section 1902(a)(10)(C) [42 USCS 
§ 1396a(a)(10)(C)]. 
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled (as 
defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42 USCS § 1382c(a)(3)] that meets the 
following conditions: 
(i) The trust is established and managed by a non-profit association, 
(ii) A separate account is maintained for each beneficiary of the trust, 
but, for purposes of investment and management of funds, the trust 
pools these accounts. 
(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely for the benefit of 
individuals who are disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42 
USCS § 1382c(a)(3)] by the parent, grandparent, or legal guardian of 
such individuals, by such individuals, or by a court, 
(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account 
upon the death of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust 
pays to the State from such remaining amounts in the account an 
amount equal to the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf 
of the beneficiary under the State plan under this title [42 USCS 
§§ 1396 et seq.]. 
(5) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance with stan-
dards specified by the Secretary) under which the agency waives the applica-
tion of this subsection with respect to all individual if the individual 
establishes that such application would wdrk an undue hardship on the indi-
vidual as determined on the basis of criteria established by the Secretary. 
(6) The term "trust" includes any legal instrument or device that is similar 
to a trust but includes an annuity only to such extent and in such manner as 
the Secretary specifies. 
(e) Definitions. In this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and 
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any 
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income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is 
entitled to but does not receive because of action— 
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such 
individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at 
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's 
spouse. 
(2) The term ' 'income" has the meaning given such term in section 1612 
[42 USCS § 1382a]. 
(3) The term "institutionalized individual" means an individual who is an 
inpatient in a nursing facility, who is an inpatient in a medical institution and 
with respect to whom payment is made based on a level of care provided in 
a nursing facility, or who is described in section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VI) [42 
USCS § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VI)]. 
(4) The term "noninstitutionalized individual" means an individual receiv-
ing any of the services specified in subsection (c)(l)(C)(ii). 
(5) The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in section 1613 
[42 USCS § 1382b], without regard (in the case of an institutionalized indi-
vidual) to the exclusion described in subsection (a)(1) of such section. 
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XIX, § 1917, as added Sept. 3, 1982, P. L. 97-
248, Title I, Subtitle B, § 132(b), 96 Stat. 370; Jan. 12, 1983, P. L. 97-448, 
Title m , § 309(b)(21), (22); 96 Stat. 2410; Dec. 22, 1987, P. L. 100-203, Title 
IV, Subtitle C, Part 2, §4211(h)(12), 101 Stat. 1330-208; July 1, 1988, P. L. 
100-360, Title ffl, § 303(b), Title IV, Subtitle B, § 411(1)(3)(1), 102 Stat. 760, 
803; Oct. 13, 1988, P. L. 100-485, Title VI, § 608(d)(16)(B), 102 Stat. 2417; 
Dec. 19, 1989, P.L. 101-239, Title VI, Subtitle B, Part 2, § 6411(e)(1), 103 
Stat. 2271; Aug. 10, 1993, P.L. 103-66, Title XIII, Ch 2, Subch B, Part II, 
§§ 13611(aMc), 13612(aMc), 107 Stat. 622, 627.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Explanatory notes: 
The bracketed period has been added at the end of subsec. (c)(2)(D) to 
indicate the probable intent of Congress to include such punctuation. 
Effective date of section: 
Act Sept. 3, 1982, P. L. 97-248, Title I, Subtitle B, § 132(d), 96 Stat. 373, 
which appears as a note to this section, provided in part that this section 
"shall become effective on the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted 
Sept. 3, 1982].". 
Amendments: 
1983. Act Jan. 12, 1982 (effective as if originally included as a part of this 
section as added by Act Sept. 3, 1982, as provided by § 309(c)(2) of the 
1983 Act, which appears as 42 USCS § 426-1 note), in subsec. (b)(2)(B), 
in the concluding matter, substituted "who has lawfully resided" for "and 
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